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Abstract
Suppose that, other things equal, an individual's utility increases
with the fraction of residents in his community who are rich. Suppose
further that the rich are more willing to pay for a local public than are
the poor Then the rich may over-provide a local public good, with the
aim of dissuading the poor from moving into a community inhabited by
the rich. We describe conditions under which the equilibrium will have
mixed or homogeneous communities, and conditions under which the
rich or the poor benet from central government rules which constrain
local decision making.
1 Introduction
An individual may want to live in a community where many of the residents
are rich. The motive can arise from enjoying the high taxes paid by the rich,
from peer-group eects in education, or from a desire for status that appears
when living in a rich community. Such preferences can lead a community to
adopt policies which appeal more to the rich than to the poor. In particular, if
services provided by a local government are normal goods, then a community
which provides high level of the service, and consequently imposes high taxes,
can attract the rich but not the poor.
If people are mobile and residents cannot be excluded directly based on
their income, the possibility arises of the poor chasing the rich. Policy makers
1may use indirect instruments to reduce the attractiveness to the poor of
a rich community: requiring minimum consumption of some private good;
subsidizing the provision of some private good; distorting the provision of a
public good.
As often noted, the possibility of the poor chasing the rich makes the
sorting models in the theory of asymmetric information important for the
economics of the local public sector. The outcomes of people's interjurisdic-
tional mobility often share many of the characteristics of the separating or
pooling equilibria in models of competitive insurance markets, and of other
adverse selection problems. Voting choices complicate these outcomes, and
may preclude the existence of well{behaved equilibria. To avoid these com-
plications, and to highlight the implications of mobility, we assume instead
that local policies are not chosen directly by residents.
The equilibria under mobility resemble those found in the literature on
sorting. If the proportion of poor people is suciently high, the unique equi-
librium will be a separating one: poor people reside in a jurisdiction which
provides their preferred level of the local public good, and rich people live in
a jurisdiction which over{provides the local public good in such a quantity
so as to leave a poor person indierent between jurisdictions. If, instead, the
proportion of rich people in the general population is high, a pooling but not
a separating equilibrium will exist. In this pooling equilibrium, all people,
rich and poor, live in identical jurisdictions which provide a rich person's
preferred level of the local public good.1
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these two types of equilibria. In the gures, the
horizontal axis shows the level of public output (per capita) provided by a
jurisdiction. The variable  graphed along the vertical axis is the proportion
of the population of a jurisdiction which is rich. The gures also show the
indierence curves for the two groups of people. We suppose that the poor
have steeper indierence curves than the rich.2 And we suppose that both
groups prefer the company of more rich people (higher values of ).
One of our main concerns is the eect of nationally{imposed restrictions
on the resulting equilibrium, and on the well{being of the two groups of
residents. We consider several dierent types of restriction here: ceilings or
oors on the level of local public good provision by city managers; grants or
1So the equilibria here are exact analogies of those in Wilson's (1977) model of com-
petitive insurance markets in which rms anticipate rivals' exit decisions.
2Actually, the assumption is that the slope of the indierence curves of the poor is
higher, which actually means \less steep" if the indierence curves slope down.
2subsidies to some jurisdictions (which must be nanced by taxes on other
jurisdictions, or on the general public); abolition of the local level of gov-
ernment, and its replacement by uniform national provision of the public
output.
2 Literature
The consequences of the poor (potentially) chasing the rich have been ex-
plored in the literature. Many authors consider, for example, the distortions
mobility might impose on policy choices in jurisdictions controlled by the rich.
In models with a land market, minimum lot{size zoning has been explained
as an exclusionary device. Examples are Hamilton (1975, 1976), Wheaton
(1993), and Fernandez and Rogerson (1984). Wilson (1998) analyzes the
incentives of rich jurisdictions to over{provide local public goods as an ex-
clusionary device. Hoyt and Lee (2003) extend this analysis by showing that
a rich jurisdiction may also wish to subsidize private goods in equilibrium,
as an exclusionary device.
Most of this literature takes the number of jurisdictions as xed. In con-
trast, we explicitly consider free entry of new jurisdictions. This lets us more
clearly relate the equilibrium policy choices with those obtaining in models
of sorting under perfect competition with asymmetric information.3 A large
literature examines entrepreneurial behavior in the local public sector. Im-
portant examples are Berglas (1976), Berglas and Pines (1981), Scotchmer
and Wooders (1987), Brueckner and Lee (1989), Scotchmer (1997) and Con-
ley and Wooders (1998). Much of that literature assumes that entrepreneurs
are \small," taking the utility attained by dierent types of resident as given.
In contrast, we let each entrepreneur explicitly consider the eect of his policy
choices on people's location patterns.
A more important contrast between this paper and the earlier literature
is our consideration of a higher level of government. The main focus here is
a comparative{static analysis of the sorting equilibria. We allow policies of
the national government to aect the policies chosen in equilibrium by local
governments.
Several authors consider how the provision of public services can attract
dierent types of residents. Tiebout (1956), in a footnote, speculates that
3The classic paper is Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Dionne, Doherty and Fombaron
(2000) survey this literature.
3individuals may desire to live near nice neighbors, but does pursue the im-
plications of this idea for his theory. Strahilevitz (2006) does. Becker and
Murphy (2000) observe that local governments may use restrictive zoning,
housing codes, and high spending on schools that raise property taxes; such
policies would appeal more to the rich or other groups the municipalities
want to attract.
Epple and Romer (1991) present a static model where voters who choose
local policies consider how policies aect the inter-community migration equi-
librium. Their model focuses on intra-community redistribution, not public-
good provision. Epple and Romano (2003) consider a peer-group eect in
schools, and allow residents to vote on how much to spend on education. But
in their model the vote on spending is made after people choose where to live,
and therefore voters cannot use spending decisions to aect the composition
of the schools. We, instead, allow people to move in response to spending
decisions, and so spending can be strategic.
An elected ocial may bias services with the aim of attracting people
who would likely vote for the ocial, and encourage the out-migration of
his political opponents. Glaeser and Shleifer (2005) discusses Mayor Curley
of Boston, who used wasteful redistribution to his poor Irish constituents
and incendiary rhetoric to encourage richer citizens to emigrate from the
city, thereby shaping the electorate in his favor. The model by Brueckner
and Glazer (2008) resembles Glaeser and Schleifer's in considering how cur-
rent policy aects migration and thus future policy. Whereas Glaeser and
Shleifer (2005) focus on the incentives of vote-maximizing incumbent o-
cials, Brueckner and Glazer (2008) consider the preferences of residents, and
allow for a broader range of policies than redistribution.
Some work considers clubs where members of each type gain direct utility
from the presence of the other type (Brueckner and Lee 1989). In his clas-
sic work, Becker (1957) explores a model where some individuals in a group
prefer to work with persons of the same group. Under factor price equal-
ization this leads to segregation in dierent sectors. Borjas (1982) assumes
that white constituents prefer to be served by white clerks in a government
agency, and that blacks prefer to be served by blacks. Arrow (1972) sup-
poses that some whites do not like to work with blacks. Berglas (1976) and
McGuire (1991) study the characteristics of a competitive equilibrium when
rms hire workers with dierent skills.
The interaction of voting and migration is an important phenomenon
which has been well analyzed in an extensive literature, including Ellickson
4(1971), Westho (1977), Rose{Ackerman (1979), Epple, Filimon and Romer
(1984, 1993), and de Bartolome (1990).
3 Assumptions
3.1 City managers
Equilibrium is often dicult to characterize when people vote on policy as
well as voting with their feet, especially when no land market rations attrac-
tive jurisdictions. If we require that decisions about provision of a public
good result from voting by residents of the jurisdiction under pairwise ma-
jority rule, and that people be perfectly mobile among jurisdictions, then
equilibrium may fail to exist.
An alternative approach is to assume that jurisdictions are controlled
by prot-maximizing entrepreneurs, charging residents admission fees to the
jurisdiction, which are not required to equal the per capita cost of the public
sector.4
In keeping with the notion of competitive markets under asymmetric in-
formation, we assume that jurisdictions' policies are under private control,
with free entry of new jurisdictions. But we assume that each jurisdiction's
proprietor takes as given the policies oered by competing jurisdictions. In
the canonical model of competitive insurance under asymmetric information
(Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976), rms try to earn positive prots from the
introduction of new insurance contracts, taking as given the contracts of-
fered by other rms. An equilibrium is a set of contracts for which no such
protable entry by new rms is possible.
Our assumption that public output levels in the model are set by \city
managers," rather than set directly by residents can be relaxed without
changing the results. The equilibrium menus will be the same, whether ju-
risdictions are run by city managers, or by prot{maximizing entrepreneurs
who can select admission fees. The menus will also be the same if public
output levels are chosen by voters | provided that an equilibrium in pure
strategies exists in this latter case.
4We assume throughout that the cost per capita of a given level of local public good
provision does not vary with the number of people. This assumption of constant returns to
scale in population is consistent with most of the literature (starting with Tiebout 1956),
and with some empirical evidence.
53.2 Population
The population consists of  P > 0 poor people, and of  R > 0 rich people.
The fraction of rich people in the population is  :
  
 R
 R +  P
(1)
The preference of a type{i (i 2 fP;Rg) person can be represented by a
utility function Ui(g;), where g is the level provided of the public good in
the jurisdiction in which the person lives, and where  is the proportion of
the population | in that jurisdiction | which is rich.
As argued below, several phenomena can be represented by this reduced{
form utility measure. In all the cases described below, exogenously set rules
determine how much each resident pays in taxes to nance the provision of
the public good.
For example, suppose the cost of the local public sector is shared equally
by all residents in a jurisdiction. Suppose also that residents care directly
about the income composition of their jurisdiction, perhaps arising from con-
cerns about status, or from peer-group eects. Thus, their utility could
be represented by some function Vi(x;g;), where x is consumption of a
num eraire private good. Then if the cost per person per unit of the local
public good is c, Ui(g;)  Vi(yi cg;g;), where yi is the exogenous income
of a type{i person.
Alternatively, if the cost of the public good is nanced by a proportional
income tax, then the tax rate t in a jurisdiction satises
t(g;) =
cg
yR + (1   )yP
; (2)
so that Ui(g;) = Vi((1 t(g;))yi;g;), which would depend on the popula-
tion composition even if the direct utility measure Ui(;;) were independent
of the income composition . Since the cost of paying for the public sector
is subsumed in the utility measure Ui(g;), increases in g may increase or
decrease a resident's utility. We make the following \standard" assumptions
about this utility measure:
1. For each income class i 2 fP;Rg and each possible population compo-










@ > 0 for all i 2 fP;Rg, g > 0 and  2 [0;1]





1 ;1) = UP(g

P(0);0):
4. If g0 > g, and if UP(g;) = UP(g0;0), then UR(g0;0) > UR(g;)
Assumption ?? makes sense if the poor must pay some share of the cost
of the public sector, no matter how small. Then a suciently high level of
public output would drive their private consumption to zero, and it seems
reasonable to assume that no peer{group or status eect can compensate for
starvation.
Assumption ?? is the usual single{crossing property. It ensures that the
the indierence curve of a rich person through any (p;) combination is
atter than the indierence curve through the same point of a poor person
| when g is depicted on the horizontal axis and  on the vertical. (Since
indierence curves can slope down or up, \less than" here means greater in
absolute value if both groups' indierence curves sloped down.)
Each person chooses from a menu of jurisdictions. Each individual ignores
her own inuence on the income distribution in the dierent jurisdictions.
So she chooses her most preferred jurisdiction from those available, taking
as given the income distribution parameter  in each jurisdiction.
Of course this parameter  must be consistent with the location choices
people make. We assume that a city manger cannot directly exclude people
from a jurisdiction. Either a person's income is private information when
she chooses where to live, or a legal proscription prohibits any discrimination
based on income.
Since people's perception of the income distribution must be based on
the actual income distribution, we dene a distribution of population as
consistent with the available menu of local public output levels, and with
the perceived income distribution, if the perceived proportion of rich people
7in a jurisdiction equals the actual proportion, after people make their optimal
location choices.
Figure 1 illustrates indierence curves for preferences which are consistent
with the above assumptions. Curve IP represents the indierence curve of
a poor person through (g
P(0);0), here represented by the point Poorville.
Curve IR is the indierence curve of a rich person through (gE
1 ;1), here
represented by the point Richville.
3.3 Denition of equilibrium
Our equilibrium concept is analogous to a competitive equilibrium in sorting
models. Private entrepreneurs seek to make prots by charging admission fees
to new jurisdictions for which they have guaranteed some level of provision for
the local public good. An equilibrium is a set of local public good provision
levels such that no new entrepreneur can make a prot by providing some
distinct level of local public good provision.
We modify the above denition in two ways. First, we allow entrepreneurs
to introduce (dierent) multiple jurisdictions. However, no cross{subsidization
is allowed; an entrepreneur cannot lose money on any single jurisdiction.
Second, we restrict the entrepreneurs to breaking even with their contracts,
rather than making positive prot. This zero-prot condition lets us analyze
the existence of equilibrium using two-dimensional graphs. But an outcome
will be an equilibrium under this restriction if and only if it is an equilibrium
when entrepreneurs are free to choose whatever admission fee they wish.5
As in competitive insurance models, competition drives prots down to zero
even without this restriction.
The equilibrium concept used here diers in an important respect from
that in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Consider the eect of entry by a new
rm in the model by Rothschild and Stiglitz. Cream{skimming by a new
entrant may alter the mix of consumers served by existing rms, and this
cream{skimming may cause some of the contracts oered by existing rms
to become unprotable. As is usual in models of competitive behavior, new
entrants are assumed not to anticipate the eect of their entry on other rms'
prots, and on the potential exit of no{longer{protable rms.
In the model presented here, cream{skimming aects not the prots of
existing rms, but the value of  in other jurisdictions. This change will aect
5Provided that they charge the same admission fee to all.
8the consistent allocations. In other words, in the Rothschild{Stiglitz (1976)
model, rms play Nash with regard to their strategic variables, the price{
quantity pairs they oer, and assume that altering their own behavior will not
change the other rms' contracts. In the current model, city managers play
Nash in output levels g. The 's are not strategic variables, but consequences
of the city managers' output choices. A new entrant assumes its own behavior
will not change other city managers' output choices, but will change the
allocation of residents, since the residents are not strategic players but instead
respond passively to city managers' choices.
So the model here is formally closer to the modication of the Rothschild{
Stiglitz model made by Wilson (1977), ensuring the existence of equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, the equilibrium outcomes here are more similar to those in
this modied insurance model.
The timing of the model is as follows. First a national legislature decides
which restrictions, if any, to impose on prospective city managers who decide
local policies. Then city managers make their choices of local public good
levels, anticipating the migration responses of residents. Then residents sort
themselves, so that they reside only in the jurisdictions which they most
prefer (which choice depends, of course, on the location decisions of others).
4 Equilibria
The concept of equilibrium is the usual subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
City managers anticipate the locational choices people will make. They
choose to enter if and only if each of the jurisdictions they operate can at-
tract a positive population, given the choices made by other city managers,
and given the subsequent location decisions of individuals. Since the popula-
tion distributions consistent with a given menu of local public output levels
need not be unique, we must place further restrictions on the population
distributions which result from city managers' decisions. But we defer these
formalities to section ?? (and subsequent sections).
4.1 Separating equilibrium
We shall present the results graphically here. The Appendix gives formal
analysis and proofs. In Figure 1, curve IP is an indierence curve of a poor
person. It is constructed to be tangent to the horizontal axis; that is, it repre-
9sents the highest utility a poor person can obtain if no rich people live in the
community in which he lives. A poor person who lives in a community with
only the poor maximizes his utility by choosing the level of g represented by
point Poorville (this is the tangency point with the horizontal axis). Any-
where above this curve represents a higher level of utility for a poor person
than points on curve IP.
The point Richville is constructed to satisfy the selection constraint, that
no poor person prefers to move into rich jurisdictions. It lies on the right-
hand side of indierence curve IP, where the fraction of rich people in the
community is 1. Curve IR is the indierence curve of a rich person through
point Richville. The horizontal dashed line in the middle of the graph rep-
resents the proportion of the population (aggregated over all communities)
that is rich, an analogue to the \pooling line" in models of insurance.
In this gure, the indierence curve IR of the rich lies above this pooling
line. Under these conditions, a separating equilibrium exists. All rich people
live in communities consisting only of rich people. Each enjoys consumption
at point Richville, on indierence curve IR. All poor people live in com-
munities consisting only of poor people. Each enjoys consumption at point
Poorville, on indierence curve IP. Note that if these points represent the
allocations, then no rich person would want to move to any newly established
community which gives a consumption point below curve IR, so no commu-
nity which lies between curve IR and IP is feasible. And no poor person
would want to live in a community which lies below curve IP.
The poor and the rich would both prefer to live in a community which
gives a consumption point in the area above curve IR. But no such com-
munity could be established|if it were, all the poor and all the rich would
want to live there, so that the proportion of the rich in such a community
would necessarily be the same as in the population as a whole, or at the level
indicated by the horizontal dashed line. Since this horizontal line lies below
curve IR, entry of such a new community is impossible.
The high level of g at point Richville can be interpreted to mean that the
rich want to provide high g (with concommitant high taxes) to deter the poor
from moving into their communities; in the absence of such a consideration,
the rich would prefer to consume somewhere to the left of point Richville,
where less g is provided.
104.2 Pooling equilibrium
A dierent equilibrium, with pooling, appears if the rich are a suciently
large fraction of the population. Indierence curve IP in Figure 2 is the same
as in Figure 1; indierence curve IR1 in Figure 2 is the same as indierence
curve IR in Figure 1. Curve IR2 is tangent at point Pooling to the dashed
horizontal pooling line. This horizontal line represents the fraction of the
population that is rich, and is higher than in Figure 1.
Point Pooling is an equilibrium. Any point above IR2 is infeasible: it
would attract all the rich and the poor in the population, implying that
the proportion of rich in each community is greater than their proportion
of the population | an impossibility. Any community with an allocation
below indierence curve IR2 would be less attractive to the rich than is the
community at point Pooling. Therefore, any such community would attract
no rich people, leading the poor to live in a community at point Poorville,
which each nds inferior to living in a community at point Pooling.
Notice that the rich are better o at point Pooling than at point Richville.
As long as the pooling line is above the indierence curve IR1 through the
point Richville, the rich will benet from an increase in the proportion of the
rich in the population.6 And since the poor are better o at point Pooling
than at point Poorville, they too benet from an increase in the proportion
of the rich in the population.
This upsetting of the separating equilibrium with a pooling contract op-
erates exactly as in adverse selection models. However, unlike the result in
in Rothschild and Stiglitz, an equilibrium can exist in this situation. Pooling
outcomes cannot be upset so easily by cream{skimming by new entrants.
A new entrant who attempts to attract only the rich residents of a mixed
jurisdiction would lower the value of  in the existing mixed jurisdiction. In
insurance markets, this reduces the prots of an existing rm below zero, but
it does not change the attractiveness of the existing contract to high{risk (or
low{risk) customers. Here the fall in  harms directly the poor (and rich)
residents of an existing jurisdiction. In doing so, it may induce the poor, as
well as the rich, to leave the existing jurisdiction. This of course would undo
the new entrant's plan, of attracting only the rich.
6Once the pooling line is below this indierence curve, as in Figure 1, further decreases
in the proportion of rich people have no eect on either group's equilibrium utility.
115 Spending limits
The separating equilibrium has the poor potentially worse o than they would
be in an equilibrium where communities are heterogeneous. The feasible
outcome the poor would most like is an equilibrium in which each community
has a proportion of the rich and poor identical to that in the population as
a whole.
Suppose then that the poor were a majority in the population, controlling
a central government which could restrict local governments. The poor could
gain by limiting local spending on the locally provided good. Such a restric-
tion could eliminate the separating equilibrium, to the benet of the poor.
This motive could explain restrictions on local spending, such as adopted by
California's Proposition 13, or the Serrano decision, which required equaliza-
tion of spending across school districts.
In a separating equilibrium the high level of g and associated taxes dis-
suade the poor from living among the rich. The poor may therefore benet
from a spending limit on g. Figure 4 shows how. In the absence of a spending
constraint, Figure 4, like Figure 1, shows a separating equilibrium with the
rich consuming at Richville and the poor consuming at Poorville. In Figure
4, indierence curve IP is the same as in Figure 1|it shows the highest util-
ity the poor can get in a community consisting only of the poor. Indierence
curve IR2 is tangent to the horizontal line, at point T.
Now suppose a constraint is imposed (say by the central government) that
the maximum level of g not exceed the level associated with point T. Then
the equilibrium is a pooling one, with all communities represented by point
T. At point T, the poor are better o than at the separating equilibrium
where the poor consume at Poorville. The rich would prefer a community
above indierence curve IR2, but the constraint on g means that any such
community would also attract the poor, and so is unattainable.
Though a spending limit can benet the poor, as just seen, a small spend-
ing limit may hurt the rich without helping the poor. This is shown in Figure
3. It diers from Figure 4 in having a less stringent spending limit. If the
original equilibrium (with no spending limit) were a separating equilibrium,
then the outcome of a spending limit which is just binding must be the one
depicted in this gure. The equilibrium in this situation would have all the
rich and some of the poor live in a community with allocation at point Mixed,
and some of the poor consuming at Poorville. The limit on spending on g
12hurts the rich, but does not help the poor.7
We have so far discussed caps on spending by local governments. But
we note that an eective cap can be imposed by setting some (nonlinear)
spending requirements. Suppose the central government says that if a city
provides some service, then it must provide at least G+H +. An example
would be building codes for theaters in schools. The constraint would induce
the rich to go below gH, thereby eectively imposing a cap.
6 Uniform service
The second generation of scal federalism literature emphasizes that uni-
formity of public good provision diers from centralization. But uniform
provision is feasible if policy of the local public sector is dictated by the
national government. Consider then the choice between uniform provision
by the central government, and the equilibrium prevailing under competitive
behavior by city managers (with none of the central government regulations
described in the previous section ).
Consider a rst, \constitutional" stage, at which residents chose whether
to have (i) free{entry, competitive provision by many city managers, with
no central government regulation, or (ii) uniform provision, with the level
chosen by majority rule at the national level. If the poor are in the majority
nationally (that is, if   < 1=2), then the poor must do better under unifor-
mity: they get to set the level of g that maximizes their utility, and also enjoy
the benets of living in a community with rich people. This must make them
better o than under decentralization : in a separating equilibrium they do
not enjoy thebenets of living in a community with rich people, and in a
pooling equilibrium they do not get to set their preferred level of g. While
uniform central provision is better for the poor in this situation, it must be
strictly worse for the rich.
Conversely, if the rich are in the majority, they must do at least as well
under decentralization as under uniformity. But this preference may be weak
; with   > 1=2 unform provision yields the same outcome as a pooling
equilibrium under decentraliztion. What benets the rich may not necessarily
harm the poor here. With   > 1=2, the poor may be better o, or worse o,
7In Lee (1993), spending limits harm bureaucrats, but only benet voters if they are
suciently large. However, unlike the case considered here, in Lee (1993) small spending
limits make everyone (voters and bureaucrats) strictly worse o .
13in a separating equilibrium under decentralization than under uniform central
provision. Figure 6 illustrates the poor beneting from decentralization, and
Figure 5 the poor being hurt.
7 Transfers among jurisdictions
The model here may also explain the popularity of transfers from higher levels
of government to low{income communities. If local government policies are
decentralized, and if residents are mobile, these transfers may benet both
the rich and the poor.
That is, consider again a prior constitutional stage, at which a national
legislature decides whether to provide transfers to communities with a large
proportion of poor inhabitants. These transfers may be nanced directly by
payments from richer communities, or indirectly through a national income
tax.8 In either case, the rich will be making transfers to any of the poor
people who choose to live in homogeneous communities. But the rich may
still benet from such a transfer policy, through its eect on the location
decisions of poor people. Transferring resources to Poorville make that poor{
only community more attractive. Doing so means that Richville does not
have to distort its public expenditure decision as much, in order to keep out
the poor. In some case, introducing these transfers may induce a Pareto{
preferred separating equilibrium under decentralization.
In particular, suppose that peer-group benets are a normal good, with
the poor valuing them little, and the rich valuing them much. Suppose as
well that the equilibrium under decentralization is a separating equilibrium.
Transfers to any some community in which  is below some (low) threshold
would make a poor community more attractive, thereby allowing the rich
to reduce spending on g in rich jurisdictions, without inducing the poor to
migrate. As an extreme example, suppose a poor person pays almost no
taxes. An increase in g in a rich community will not prevent migration. But
a subsidy to a poor community can deter migration.
Notice that subsidies here are directed not at poor people, but at commu-
nities inhabited exclusively by poor people. Indeed, because an increase in a
poor person's income increases his willingness to pay for g and his willingness
to pay for peer-group benets, a direct subsidy hurts the rich. Instead, the
rich favor a subsidy or transfer that is contingent on the individual residing
8The latter case seems more common in practice.
14in a jurisdiction populated by the poor. A subsidy to the jurisdiction itself
accomplishes the goal.
158 Appendix: Analytical solution
8.1 Assumptions
This Appendix formalizes the results given above.
DEFINITION A population distribution
f(L1;1);(L2;2);:::;(LN;N)g of total populations Li for each jurisdiction,
and proportion of rich people i in each jurisdiction is dened to be consis-




n=1 nLn =  R

PN
n=1(1   n)Ln =  P
 If mLm > 0, then VR(gm;m)  VR(gn;n) for any n 6= m.
 If (1   m)Lm > 0, then VP(gm;m)  VP(gn;n) for any n 6= m.
 If gm > gn, then m  n
 If UP(gm;0)  UP(gn;1) then n = 1
 If Lm > 0 and m > 0, then n = 1 for gn > gm.
This denition says that individuals do not behave strategically here, that
the population composition reects their optimizing choices, and that they
perceive correctly the income composition of each jurisdiction.
The nal three items are needed only to account for completely empty
jurisdictions. If Lm and Ln are both positive, then the single{crossing as-
sumption ensures that m  n if gm > gn. As well, if UP(gm;0)  UR(gn;1),
then no poor person would ever choose to live in jurisdiction n, so that n
must equal 1 if Ln > 0. But if Ln = 0, then the fraction rich in jurisdiction n
is arbitrary. It seems a natural restriction on people's beliefs that they infer
that higher{public{output jurisdictions are more likely to attract richer resi-
dents. Absent some restrictions on the fraction n attributed to unpopulated
16jurisdictions, there would be far too many consistent population distributions
for any given menu of output levels.9
At the risk of terminological overkill, we introduce a further restriction
on population distributions. Without this restriction, equilibrium may fail
to exist.
DEFINITION: A population distribution
f(L1;1);(L2;2);:::;(LN;N)g is said to correspond to a menu
(g1;g2;:::;gN) of public output levels if
 The population distribution is consistent with the menu (g1;g2;:::;gN)
 No other population distribution consistent with that menu is weakly
preferred by both income classes, and is strictly preferred by at least
one income class.
This restriction can be motivated by some possibility of communication
among residents: certainly they have an incentive to coordinate on a popu-
lation which they all prefer.10
8.1.1 Denition of equilibrium
DEFINITION A menu (g1;g2;:::;gN), and a population distribution
9For example, suppose that there are two jurisdictions, with g1 and g2 close to each
other in value, and with g
P( ) < g1 < g2 < g
R( ). Then if the nal restriction on
unpopulated jurisdictions were not used, there would be at least two consistent population
distributions: one in which everybody chose to live in jurisdiction 1, and attributed a value
of 2 = 0 to jurisdiction 2, and one in which everyone chose to live in jurisdiction 2 and
attributed a value of 1 = 0 to jurisdiction 1. Only the second distribution is consistent,
when the second{last restriction in the denition above is imposed.
10As an example a consistent population distribution which does not correspond to the
menu of public output levels, consider two jurisdictions, with g1 = g
R( ) and g2 > g1 such
that UR(g2;1) = UR(g
R( );  )    where  is very small but positive.
One consistent allocation is to have all the people, rich and poor, locate in jurisdiction
1. But if a few people from jurisdiction 1 were to move to jurisdiction 2, then the utility of
the remaining residents of jurisdiction 1 would fall. Let 0 <   be the proportion such that
UR(g1;0) = UR(g2;1). Then if R0 rich people moved from jurisdiction 1 to jurisdiction
2, where 0(  R R0 +  P) =  R R0, there would be another consistent allocation, in which
(L1;1);(L2;2) = (L1   R0;0);(R0;1). This second allocation is Pareto{dominated by
the rst, since the fall in 1 lowers the utility they both attain in jurisdiction 1, which is still
inhabited by both income classes. Therefore, this second allocation does not correspond
to the output menu (g1;g2).
17f(L1;1);(L2;2);:::;(LN;N)g corresponding to it is said to be an equilib-
rium if there are no distinct new levels of public output
(gN+1;gN+2;:::;gN+M) = 2 fg1;g2; ;gNg such that there exists a popula-
tion distribution corresponding to (g1;g2;:::;gN;gN+1;:::;gN+M) for which
Lm > 0 m = 1;2; ;M.
Note that to upset an existing population distribution, an entrant may
need to open several new jurisdictions.
8.2 Some Properties of Equilibrium
Lemma 1 There cannot be two jurisdictions m and n with distinct levels of
local public output gm and gn such that both jurisdictions get positive numbers
of both type of resident in any consistent population distribution.
Proof This result follows from the single{crossing assumption. If gm >
gn, and UP(gm;m) = UP(gn;n), then rich people must prefer jurisdiction
n strictly, so that m = 0. 
Lemma 2 There cannot be an equilibrium in which jurisdiction n has posi-
tive population, and in which   < n < 1.
Proof Suppose that Ln > 0 and that   < n < 1.
Lemma ?? implies that no jurisdiction other than jurisdiction n has pos-
itive numbers of both people. If n >   then some poor people do not reside
in jurisdiction n. So that implies that in the population distribution corre-
sponding to the given local output levels some other jurisdiction (call it P)
attracts some poor people (and no rich people).
If gP 6= g
P(0) then a new entrant could oer the local public output
level g
P(0) and attract all the poor people (who would get strictly higher
utility). So if the menu of local public outputs is an equilibrium, then some
jurisdiction provides the local public output level g
1(0), and has some poor
(but no rich) residents.
That means that UP(gn;n) = UP(g
1(0);0), since some poor people
choose to live in each jurisdiction.
Now suppose that some new city manager enters, and oers the lo-
cal public output level gE
1 , dened above as the output level for which
UP(g
1(0);0) = UP(gE
1 ;1). Therefore, UP(gE
1 ;1) also equals UP(gn;n).
18The single{crossing property then implies that UP(gE
1 ;1) > UP(gn;), for
any   n.
Therefore there exists a population distribution consistent with the menu
(gn;g
1(0);gE
1 ) for which all poor people choose the jurisdiction providing
g
P(0) and all rich people choose the jurisdiction providing gE
1 . This distribu-
tion is not Pareto dominated by any other consistent distribution for these
three output levels.
So either a new city manager can enter, providing gE
1 , and attracting a
positive number of rich people, or an existing jurisdiction already is providing
gE
1 (or something better). In the rst case, the menu is not an equilibrium; in
the second case the assumption that jurisdiction n had positive population
and 1 > n >   is violated. 
Lemma 3 There cannot be an equilibrium in which jurisdiction n has posi-
tive population, and in which   > n > 0.
Proof Suppose that Ln > 0 and that   > n > 1.
Lemma ?? implies that no jurisdiction other than jurisdiction n has pos-
itive numbers of both people. If n <   then not all rich people reside
in jurisdiction n. So that implies that in the population distribution corre-
sponding to the given local output levels there is some other jurisdiction (call
it R) which attracts some rich people (and no poor people).
The rich people must be indierent between jurisdictions n and R.
Now suppose that some new city manager enters, with a public output
level g0 which is very close to gn, close enough that
UR(g
0;  ) > UR(g
n;
n):
Such a public output level must exist, because of the continuity of preferences,
because preferences are monotonic in , and because n <  . Furthermore,
if g0 is suciently close to gn, it will be true that
UP(g
0;  ) > UP(g
n;
n):
So a population distribution exists which is consistent with the new menu
(after the entry of the new city manager) in which the new entrant attracts
all the people (of all income classes): just assign the existing jurisdictions
the same level of m which they had in the previous population distribution
(before the entry). With this assignment, people of both classes prefer strictly
19the new entrant's jurisdiction to any of the existing jurisdictions. Therefore,
the new population distribution corresponds to the new menu of local public
output levels, and the new entrant attracts a positive population, proving
the lemma. 
The lemmata above imply that in any equilibrium, at most three distinct
jurisdictions will be populated (if we treat two or more jurisdictions providing
the same level of public output as equivalent to a single jurisdiction doing
so).
But the nature of equilibrium can be reduced further.
Proposition 1 An equilibrium can take one of two forms. It can be a pooling
equilibrium, with all people living in identical jurisdictions in which  =  .
Or it can be a separating equilibrium in which all rich people live in (identical)
homogeneous jurisdictions and all poor people live in (identical) homogeneous
jurisdictions.
Proof Given the previous lemmata, what must be ruled out is an
equilibrium in which L1 > 0;1 = 0, L2 > 0;2 =   and L3 > 0;3 = 1.
So suppose that there is a menu in which the population distribution is
the one just described.








Single crossing therefore requires that g3 > g2 > g1.
If the distribution corresponds to an equilibrium, no city manager can
enter and attract away the poor people by providing their most{preferred





Single{crossing also requires that
UP(g
3;1) < UP(g
2;  ) = UP(g

P(0);0);
so that g3 > gE
1 .
20Notice as well that g3 cannot equal g
R(1), since monotonicity of prefer-
ences in  imply that UR(g
R(1);1) > UR(g2;  ).
Suppose then that a new city manager entered, providing a local public
good level of g4 = max(gE
1 ;g
R(1). Then the population distribution in which
all poor people move to jurisdiction 1, and all rich people move to jurisdiction
4 corresponds to the new menu (g1;g2;g3;g4). (This population allocation
cannot be dominated since it is constrained Pareto optimal.11 )
So the menu and corresponding population distribution cannot be an
equilibrium, since the new entrant, jurisdiction 4, attracts a positive popu-
lation in the corresponding distribution. 
8.3 Separating Equilibrium
A separating equilibrium exists if
UR(g

R( );  ) < UR(g
S
1;1): (3)
Proposition 2 If UR(g
R( );  ) < UR(gS
1;1), then the only equilibria are sep-
arating equilibria, in which all rich people live in jurisdictions providing pub-
lic output level gS
1, and all poor people live in jurisdictions providing public
output level g
1(0). (And such separating equilibria must exist.)
Proof If the \right" levels of output are not being provided, then a new
entrant can create two new jurisdictions, one providing the public output level
g
P(0) and the other providing the public output level gS
1.
To demonstrate the \only" part of the Proposition, it suces to show that
for some population distribution corresponding to (g1;g2;:::;gN;g
P(0);gS
1)
all the rich people choose the jurisdiction providing gS
1 and all the poor
people choose the jurisdiction providing g
P(0) | for any public output levels
(g1;g2;:::;gN).
Set n = 0 for each i = 1;2;:::;N with g < gE
1 , and n = 1 for (only)
those existing jurisdictions for which g > gE
1 , which is consistent with the
denition of a consistent population distribution, provided Ln = 0. Since
UP(g
P(0);0)  UP(g;0) for any g, and since UP(g
P(0);0)  UP(gS
1;1) >
11See the appendix for a denition of constrained Pareto optimality, and proof that the
separating distribution just described is constrained Pareto optimal
21UP(g0;1) for any g0 > gE
1 by denition, the poor will be willing to locate in
the jurisdiction to which they have been allocated.
Single{crossing implies that no g satises UR(gE
1 ;1) < UR(g;0): if there
were such a g then the two types' indierence curves through (gE
1 ;1) must
cross twice.
The population distribution just described cannot be Pareto{dominated
by any feasible population distribution, since it is constrained Pareto optimal.
Therefore, any outcome | other than the proposed equilibrium | can
be upset by a city manager entering and providing jurisdictions with g
P(0)
and gS
1 as output levels.
It remains to prove that an outcome in which all rich people live in the
jurisdiction with gS
1, and all poor people in the jurisdiction with g
P(0), is not
susceptible to entry.
The poor will never choose to live in the jurisdiction providing gS
1 (since
they have their own jurisdiction). Therefore, after entry, the rich must attain
utility of at least UR(gS
1;1). (This conclusion depends on the belief restriction,
that requires  to equal 1 in an unpopulated jurisdiction providing gE
1 or more
of the public output.)
If the rich get utility of UR(gS
1;1) or more in some new jurisdiction n, then
it must be true that n >  , since condition (??) says that their indierence
curve through (gS
1;1) lies above the pooling line  =  . If n > 0, then
some of the poor must reside in an all{poor jurisdiction, since all mixed
jurisdictions have more rich people than the population average.
So (gn;n) must lie on the indierence curve through (g
1(0);0) of the poor
people, since some poor people live in each jurisdiction. But single{crossing,
and the denition of gE
1 , show that all points along this indierence curve
oer a rich person lower utility than UR(gS
1;1), meaning the rich will locate
only in \their" jurisdiction, which means that the rich cannot be induced to
move by any new entry. That means that the poor all reside in jurisdictions
in which  = 0, which means that they will choose to stay in the best of
those jurisdictions, the one in which g
P(0) is provided.
Thus the separating equilibrium cannot be upset by any entry, completing
the proof of the theorem. 
8.4 Pooling Equilibrium
If condition (??) does not hold, then a separating equilibrium does not ex-
ist. This non{existence is again a straightforward analogue to the results
22of Rothschild and Stiglitz. A city manager can enter, and provide the local
output level g
R( ).
If the indierence curve of the rich people through (gS
1;1) cuts the pooling
line  =  , then UR(g
R( );  ) > UR(gS
1;1). Single{crossing, and the fact that
g
R( ) < gE
1 , imply that UP(g
R( );  ) > UP(gE
1 ;1) = UP(g
P(0);0) as well.
So a consistent population distribution exists in which all the mobile
people, rich and poor, prefer strictly to move to the new entrant's jurisdiction.
Therefore the original outcome, in which all jurisdictions provided local
outputs of g
P(0) or gS
1, and attracted only one income class, cannot be an
equilibrium, since entry by a city manager oering a distinct public output
level can attract positive population.
Proposition 3 If UR(gS
1;1) < UR(g
R( );  ), then there exists an equilibrium
in which all mobile people locate in a jurisdiction oering (g
R( );  ). Under
these conditions, in any equilibrium all the mobile people locate in jurisdic-
tions oering (g
R( );  ).
Proof
We rst show that the only possible equilibrium is the one described.
It suces to show that, if g1 = g
R( ) is one of the public output levels
provided by city managers, then a population distribution corresponding to
the menu of output levels is the one in which everyone locates in jurisdiction
1.
The hypotheses of the proposition imply that UR(g1;  ) > UR(g;1) for
any g  gE
1 , and that UP(g1;  ) > UP(gE
1 ;1) = U(g
1(0);0)  U(g;0) for any
g.
As well, single{crossing implies that Ui(g
R( );  ) > Ui(g;  ) for any i 2
fP;Rg and any g > g
R( ).
So a population distribution in which jurisdiction 1 gets all the people,
and in which all other jurisdictions in which g  gE
1 are unpopulated and
have  = 1, all other jurisdictions in which g
R( ) < g < gE
1 are unpopulated
and have  =  , and all jurisdictions in which g < g
R( ) have  = 0 is
consistent with any menu in which g1 = g
R( ). This population distribution
also cannot be Pareto dominated, since it is constrained Pareto optimal.
Therefore any other menu of public output levels (in which no jurisdiction
has g = g
R( )) is susceptible to entry and cannot be an equilibrium.
To show that there is an equilibrium in which g1 = g
R( ) and in which
everyone locates in jurisdiction 1, consider the population distributions when
new entrants oer some other levels of public output g2;g3;:::;gN.
23Could the new distribution oer a higher utility to rich people (than
the utility UR(g
R( );  ) which they got in the original equilibrium)? If so,
then the rich people must all live in jurisdictions in which  >  , since the
indierence curve through (g
R( );  ) is horizontal there.
But single crossing implies that all (g;) combinations which rich people
prefer to (g
R( );  ) are preferred by poor people to g
P(0);0).
So if the rich people get higher utility in the new distribution, then we
must have the poor people all choosing to live in heterogeneous communities,
so that everyone lives in a jurisdiction in which  >   which is impossible
(since   must be the weighted average of all inhabited jurisdictions' fraction
of rich people).
Next, could the new distribution oer a higher utility to the poor peo-
ple (than the utility UP(g
R( );  ) which they got in the original equilib-
rium)? If so, the poor people must all reside in heterogeneous jurisdictions:
UP(g
R( );  ) > UP(g
P(0);0) so that they must be worse o if any of them
choose to live in exclusively poor jurisdictions.
Could jurisdiction 1 be inhabited exclusively by rich people? Then both
groups would be better o than they were in the original distribution, which
cannot happen, since the payos in the original distribution were constrained
optimal.
What if jurisdiction 1 had positive numbers of both groups in the new
equilibrium? Since only one (type of) jurisdiction can have positive numbers
of both types in equilibrium, and since poor people do not live in homoge-
neous distributions, this would imply 1 <   in the new distribution, since
jurisdiction 1 would have all the poor people and only some of the rich people.
But this contradicts the assumption that the poor people have higher
utility in the new equilibrium.
Hence the only possible distributions in which the poor are better o are
those in which jurisdiction 1 is uninhabited. The indierence curve of the
poor through (g
R( ;  ) slopes up at (g
R( ;  ), and is everywhere above the
line  = 0. So if the poor are better o in the new distribution, then they
must reside in some mixed jurisdiction for which 0 < n <   and for which
gm < g
R( ). But the restrictions on consistent population distributions
say that if jurisdiction 1 is uninhabited, and g1 > gm, and m > 0, then
1 = 1, which means that the rich would prefer strictly to reside in the
existing jurisdiction 1 to jurisdiction m, contradicting the assumption that
jurisdiction m has m > 0.
Therefore there can be no new population distribution in which either
24the rich or the poor are better o. Therefore, no new entry can yield a
corresponding population distribution in which the new entrant's jurisdiction
attracts any residents, establishing that the original pooling distribution is
an equilibrium. 
8.5 Uniformity versus Decentralization
Proposition 4 If the poor are in the national majority, then the poor are
strictly better o under uniform centralization, and the rich are strictly better
o under complete decentralization.
Proof Under uniform centralization, with policy determined by the
poor, the outcome is g
P( );  ). The assumption that each group's pre-
ferred public output level is unique, and the assumption that the rich prefer
more public output than the poor, imply that gP(g
P( );  ) > gP(g
R( ;  ).
The assumption that utility increases with  implies that UP(g
P( );  ) >
UP(g
P(0);0), so that the poor do strictly better under uniform centralization
than they do in a separating equilibrium or in a pooling equilibrium.
Under complete decentralization, the utility of the rich is either UR(g
R( );  )
(in a pooling equilibrium), or else greater than or equal to UR(g
R( );  ) (in
a separating equilibrium). Since UR(g
R( );  ) > UR(g
P( );  ), the rich must
be strictly better o under complete decentralization. 
If the rich are in a majority nationally, then they weakly prefer decentral-
ization. With the rich in a majority, uniform centralization and the pooling
equilibrium under complete decentralization give the same outcome. If there
is a separating equilibrium, then the rich must prefer their outcome (gE
1 ;1)
strictly to the outcome g
R( );  ) of uniform centralization.
However, the conict between rich and poor over the form of organiza-
tion may be less clear if the rich are in a majority. If the outcome under
complete separation is a pooling equilibrium, then there is no dierence be-
tween uniform centralization and complete decentralization (if the rich are
in a majority). But if the outcome under complete separation is a separating
equilibrium, then the poor may be better or worse o than under uniform
centralization.
Proposition 5 If the rich are in the majority, they will prefer weakly com-
plete decentralization to uniform centralization. The poor may be better, or
worse o, in a separating equilibrium than under complete centralization with
the rich in a majority.
25Proof What remains to be shown is that there are separating equilibria
in which UP(g
P(0);0) < UP(g
R( );  ) and separating equilibria in which
UP(g
P(0);0) > UP(g
R( );  ). Figure 5 illustrates the rst case, gure 6 the
second.
Underlying the gures are the following preferences. In each case, UR(g;) 
(48 g)g +500. In gure 5, UP(g;)  (36 g)g +144, whereas in gure
6 UP(g;)  (36   g)g + 40. Therefore g
R() = 24 and g
P() = 18 for any
 in either gure, gE
1 = 30 in Figure 5, gE
1 = 24:3246 in Figure 6,   = 0:54 in
each case, and in each case UR(gE
1 ;1) > UR(g
R( );  ) so that the equilibrium
under complete decentralization is separating. 
269 Appendix: Constrained Pareto Optimality
A menu of local public output levels (g1;g2;:::;gN), and a population dis-
tribution consistent with it, are constrained Pareto optimal if there is
no other menu of output levels and consistent population distribution which
makes one income class better o without making the other income class
worse o.
The use of this concept here is that, if a menu of output levels, and a
population distribution consistent with it are constrained Pareto optimal,
then the population distribution must correspond to the menu of output
levels: by denition, no other consistent population distribution can Pareto
dominate it.
Lemma 4 If condition (??) holds, then the candidate separating equilibrium,
in which all the rich people live in jurisdictions providing gS
1 and all the
poor people lives in jurisdictions providing g
0(0), must be constrained Pareto
optimal.




1 is easy: the highest possible utility for the rich to get, even
ignoring the location decisions of the poor, is the utility UR(g
R(1);1) which
they get in this situation.
Suppose then that gS
1 = gE
1  g
R(1), so the selection constraint is binding.
If some new menu and population increased the utility of the poor, then
the poor must all live in mixed jurisdictions in the new situation: previously
the utility UP(g
P(0);0) was the highest possible for them in a poor{only
jurisdiction. So making the poor strictly better o means locating them
in jurisdictions in which  > 0, and which are above their (dashed blue)
indierence curve through (g
1(1);1).
But some of the poor must live in jurisdictions in which    ), the pop-
ulation average. And condition (??) implies the rich are made strictly worse
o (from the initial separating situation) if they must locate in a jurisdiction
in which    . (The rich people's (solid red) indierence curve through
(g
R(1);1) in gure 1 lies strictly above the pooling line.) So it is impossible
to make the poor better o without making the rich worse o.
And any new situation which makes the rich better o must make the
poor better o: if a (g;) combination is above the rich people's (solid red)
indierence curve in gure 1, it must be above the poor people's indierence
curve.
27So there is no way of making one group better o than they are in the
candidate separating equilibrium without making the other group worse o.

Lemma 5 If condition (??) does not hold, then the candidate pooling equi-
librium, in which everyone lives in a jurisdiction providing a public output
level of g
R( ), must be constrained Pareto optimal.
Proof Note that in these circumstances (as in gure 2), the poor get
higher utility in the candidate equilibrium then they would in any situation
in which some of them lived in a homogeneous community: the indierence
curve of the poor through (g
R( );  ) must lie above the line  = 0 if condi-
tion (??) does not hold.
So making the poor strictly better o again implies that all the poor
have to live in mixed communities. And adding{up then implies that some
populated jurisdiction in the new situation has    . And that means that
the rich must be strictly worse o, as there is no point in gure 2 which is
on or below the pooling line  =   which gives the rich a utility level as high
as UR(g
R( );  ), except the original candidate pooling equilibrium itself.
So there is no way of making the poor better o without making the rich
strictly worse o.
Making the rich strictly better o means giving the rich a (g;) combi-
nation which is above their (solid red) indierence curve through (g
R( );  )
in gure 2. But that means that the poor must get strictly more utility than
they would in any homogeneous poor{only community. So all the poor would
have to live in mixed jurisdictions. And it was just demonstrated (in the rst
part of the proof) that putting all the poor in mixed jurisdictions must make
the rich worse o. 
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